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Abstract
Currently the Nepali government and the International Labour Organization
(ILO) are involved in a campaign to increase rates of government registration
among small businesses, which are technically illegal to operate unregistered.
The program incentivizes and facilitates registration, attempting to change the
cost-benefit analysis that shopkeepers make when deciding whether to register.
Using interviews with small business owners in the Kathmandu area, this study
provides qualitative data about what information these shopkeepers have, how
they perceive the registration process, whether the government has traditionally
followed through on its promises, and how all of these factors affect their
registration cost-benefit analyses. Additionally, this study examines the
perceptions, priorities, and methods of NGOs and government officials involved
in directing initiatives which affect the informal economy. From the shopkeeper
side we find that a confusing registration process as well as distrust in the
government are the primary barriers to registration. From the government and
NGO side we find that lack of information sharing and collaboration between
various government ministries as well as between NGOs and the government are
harmful to registration efforts.
Keywords: Economics, Government, Informal Economy
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1) Introduction
As one walks the streets of Kathmandu, small roadside shops are a
bustling source of commercial activity. These small shops, generally owned and
operated by a single individual or family, represent a significant portion of
Nepal’s overall employment, economic activity, and potential for growth. The
only problem with this keystone of Nepali commerce is that many of these small
shops are operating illegally. Although the vast majority of small shops do
honest business selling entirely legal goods and services, many of them have not
officially been registered with the government. This lack of government
documentation makes these shops a part of Nepal’s informal economy, a
nebulous term which academics have yet to define by consensus. For the
purposes of this paper we will use the definition from Ihrig and Moe (2004) to
define informal enterprises as those which produce legal goods, but do not
comply with government regulations. Specifically, this paper will focus on small
retail or food shops. Using a broader definition of the informal economy which
categorizes all unregistered activities, including those illegal by nature, as
informal, Schneider (2002) estimates that informal activity may account for forty
percent of Nepal’s GDP. Other studies testify to the substantial nature of Nepal’s
informal economy, estimating that it employs more than 96% of Nepal’s
economically active population (Suwal & Pant, 2009) overall, with 70% of those
working non-agricultural jobs involved in informal economic activity (Central
Bureau of Statistics, 2008).
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Currently, the International Labour Organization (ILO) is working with
the Nepali government towards registering the informal sector though a mixture
of incentives, informational campaigns, and bureaucratic changes. The
programme, entitled “Way Out of Informality: Facilitating Formalization of
Informal Economy in South Asia,” works closely with Nepal’s District Cottage
and Small Industries Offices (DCSIO) in an attempt to centralize registration
procedures and improve benefit distribution structures, which have previously
been very difficult for shopkeepers to access. Mr. Shailendra Kumar Jha, the
National Programme Coordinator for this project, makes it clear that forcing
shopkeepers to register is not a viable strategy; rather, he says, the government
and ILO together “must encourage and facilitate registration, highlighting the
benefits to ensure that businesses choose to register” (Kumar Jha, 2014). The
ILO is currently offering such incentives for registering as loans with the ILO’s
partner – Megabank – and business management trainings. To better understand
the cost-benefit analysis that shopkeepers make when deciding to register, my
research draws upon interviews with individual shopkeepers who have been
through the registration process, or decided to remain unregistered. Additionally,
a series of interviews with government officials and experts in the field helps to
explain the workings of Nepal’s current policy, as well as what efforts are
currently in place to aid workers in the informal sector and encourage
registration. My research will build upon a strong foundation of informal sector
literature to provide a qualitative analysis of how political and economic factors
contribute to the large quantity of illegally operating businesses in Nepal.
1.2) Informal Sector History
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Before the term “informal economy” was coined by a 1972 ILO study,
very little academic work was devoted to understanding economic activity which
was not registered with or regulated by the government. Soon afterwards,
academics began to take the challenges presented by this portion of the economy
much more seriously. Hart (1973) uses Ghana as a case study to conduct one of
the earliest analyses of an informal economy. He hypothesizes a variety of
causes for the informal economy, and notes that the emergence of this sector has
complicated income and consumption patterns significantly. Thus, one of the
first revelations about the informal economy was that it disrupted traditional
western economic theories and prescriptions, thereby making the application of
western economic and social policy in developing nations potentially disastrous
(Hart, 1973).
Following the ILO and Hart’s pioneering of informal sector research
came a still unresolved struggle to define the informal economy. While Hart
(1973) defined the informal economy as essentially synonymous with selfemployment, ILO (1972) defined Kenya’s informal sector as a space unregulated
and largely marginalized by the government. Since then, Hart has broadened his
definition to include all economic activities that take place outside the framework
of bureaucratic public and private sector establishments (Hart 2008). As
previously discussed, this paper will define informal enterprises as those which
produce legal goods, but do not comply with government regulations (Ihrig and
Moe, 2004). Though some studies explore the informal sector in developed
nations, largely the literature is focused on how developing or transitional
countries are effected by their informal economy. Elgin and Oyvat, (2013: 7) note
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that “the growth of the informal sector was observed all in Asian (Moser, 1978);
African (Wuyts, 2001); and Latin American (de Janvry, 1981; Furtado, 1976)
countries in their early phases of development.”
1.3) Informal Sector Causes
As the study of informal economies became more common, many papers
devoted themselves to understanding what caused these underground economic
activities. Ultimately the debate largely breaks down into those researchers who
attribute the growth of informal economies primarily to market factors, and those
who attribute this growth primarily to political factors.
Hart (1973) began the discussion of market factors by positing that price
inflation, low wages in the formal sector and surplus labor in the urban market
were the primary causes of informality. Future studies reinforced the idea that
labor surpluses and urbanization were among the main determinants of
informality (Breman, 1980); (Elgin and Oyvat 2013). This line of thinking
suggests that the informal sector is a natural offshoot of saturated labor markets
and weak formal economies. The belief that market forces were the primary
reason for informality created a conviction in the early stages of informal sector
studies that economic growth would pull enterprises into the formal sector.
Bangasser (2000:4) notes that before longitudinal data existed on the progress of
informal economies “It was axiomatic that, as ‘take off’ was achieved and the
development process gained momentum, the ‘modern sector’ would gradually
absorb them.” When economic growth in developing countries showed no sign
of decreasing informality – in some cases even increasing it – scholars began to
give more thought to the political factors that contributed to informality.
Lindgren 4

In 1989, De Soto’s radical work The Other Path hypothesized that the
informal economy was a logical and efficient reaction to corruption, inefficient
government bureaucracy and a formal sector made generally undesirable by
government constraints. Following this seminal work, a series of studies
reinforced that informal economies were in large part encouraged by corruption
(Dutta et al, 2013), poor government systems (Levy, 2008), government-imposed
barriers to entering the formal economy (Djankov et. al, 2002) as well as high
degrees of bureaucratic discretion; low degrees of economic liberalization; high
tax burdens; lack of credibility towards government; and macroeconomic
instability (Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996). In one of the most comprehensive
examinations of informal economies across the world, Schneider (2000:19)
confidently states “In almost all studies, the increase of the tax and social security
contribution burdens is one of the main causes for the increase of the shadow
economy (Thomas, 1992), (Lippert and Walker, 1997), (Schneider, 1994, 1997,
1998), (Johnson, Kauffman and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998a, 1998b), (De Soto, 1989),
(Zilberfarb, 1986), (Tanzi, 1999), and (Giles, 1999a).”
Only two years after De Soto’s original publication, the ILO readily
acknowledged that economic growth was not necessarily the cure for a large
informal economy saying, “Contrary to earlier beliefs, the informal sector is not
going to disappear spontaneously with economic growth. It is, on the contrary,
likely to grow in the years to come, and with it the problems of urban poverty and
congestion will also grow” (ILO, 1991: 63).
1.4) Informal Sector Consequences
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Parallel to the debate concerning the many potential causes for informal
economic activity runs an equally complex debate over a much simpler question:
are informal economies good or bad? Though most academics agree that
integrating informal economies into formal economies would be ideal in a perfect
political atmosphere, much disagreement surrounds the role of informal
economies in realistic scenarios. The essential question in this debate is whether
informal economies exacerbate the problems of inefficient governments and
disrupt formal markets, or whether they provide an avenue for productive
economic activity despite the corruption and disorganized bureaucracy that often
characterize these governments. The ILO’s 1972 publication begins the debate
by suggesting that Kenya’s informal sector is a productive, positive development
that suffers from governmental misunderstanding. The study hypothesizes that
treating informal economies as a problem may create a vicious cycle in which
governments suppress and discourage informal activity until it becomes
marginalized and inefficient (ILO, 1972). Bangasser (2000:11) posits that
despite this initial publication the ILO went on to hold “a pejorative official view
that perpetuates debilitating conditions and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of
low productivity and poverty but (sic) ignores the creative potential and energies
of the informal sector.”
Much literature following the ILO publication either made arguments that
the informal sector was harmful to the state, or implicitly assumed so. At the
macro level, Frey (1989) argues that a large informal sector deprives the state of
tax income, thereby decreasing the amount of state goods available to both formal
and informal sector workers. From the micro perspective, Kauffman and
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Kaliberda (1996) argue that the informal economy is a “survival sector” in which
workers are merely trying to maintain subsistence, and often looking for other
options. Thus they believe that investments will necessarily be low, and growth
very slow. Though findings from Brazil indicate that most self-employed
workers in the informal economy prefer to remain in this situation rather than
participate in the formal economy (Maloney, 2004), the concept that informal
employment is undesirable to its participants remains widespread. Under the
implicit assumption that the informal economy cannot provide sustained growth
for a country or productive employment for its laborers, some argue that the
informal economy is destructive because it stifles growth which would otherwise
be occurring in the formal sector (Portes, Castells, and Benton, 1989); (Gaddy
and Ickes, 1998).
Following years of general disregard for the ILO’s 1972 claim that the
informal economy could offer a legitimate alternative to formal employment, De
Soto (1989) provides the most substantial argument reiterating the productive
potential of informal economies. Having stated that informal economies are
largely caused by corruption and inefficient bureaucracy, De Soto goes on to
posit that the informal sector is a necessary escape from governments which stifle
economic growth. Ultimately De Soto advises that states make no effort to
register the informal sector until they are capable of providing a productive
business environment for all enterprises. ILO (1972), which was the first paper
to view the informal economy in a positive light, recommended that the
government respect the efficiency of the informal economy, but channel its
productive potential into the formal economy by reforming outdated and
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unnecessary licensing procedures. Similarly, Harding and Jenkins (1989) argue
that if informal economic activities are supported they can become a strong
source of economic growth for states. Levy (2008) posits that government
inefficiencies contribute to the informal sector, and recommends that
governments use incentive structures, as the ILO is doing, to formalize the
informal sector. Essentially, this vein of the literature emphasizes the linkages
between informal and formal enterprises, suggesting that the government allow
businesses to grow informally without penalty or marginalization, but encourage
them to enter the formal economy through reforming bureaucratic processes and
offering incentives.
Though various theoretical and macro-level data exists debating the
causes and consequences of the informal economy, very little examines how
policy writers and shopkeepers perceive informality. Schneider (2000: 17)
concludes a thorough macroeconomic survey of informal economies around the
world by noting:
“Because macroeconomic approaches can often only
show statistical correlation rather than causal relations,
they cannot provide answers to questions like: Why do
people choose to work in the shadow economy? What
other factors (besides income motive) cause an increase
in formal activities?... Because only individuals can
choose, according to methodological individualism, it
might be helpful to have a closer look at the individual
decision process.”
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1.5) The Individual Decision Process
While much scholarship exists surrounding the informal economy, only
recently have empirical studies begun to appear which more deeply investigate
the process of registering informal enterprises. Woodruff (2013) uses a
controlled study to measure the effectiveness of information and incentives in
attempts to register informal businesses in Sri Lanka. The study finds that
simply informing shopkeepers about the benefits of registering yields no results,
while providing cash incentives along with this information can increase
probability of registration by nearly fifty percent (Woodruff 2013). Additionally,
Woodruff’s follow-up finds that some businesses grew exponentially after
registering, suggesting that they may have been intentionally hampering their
own growth for fear of drawing government attention and being forced into the
formal sector (Woodruff 2013). Though Woodruff’s findings are an excellent
starting point, his controlled research does not emulate realistic scenarios in
which incentives consist of government programs rather than cash. Especially in
cases like that of Nepal, where my research finds that shopkeepers have difficulty
obtaining government-promised benefits, it is important to examine existing
incentive structures as opposed to theoretical ones.
Cling et al. (2012) perform an analysis of informal sector registration in
Vietnam which includes some qualitative information about the registration
decision. Cling’s analysis shows that poor information is a key determinant in
the decision to remain unregistered (Cling 2012). This finding seems to imply
that improving information should improve registration, a notion which
Woodruff (2013) found untrue in Sri Lanka. Cling also finds that for those who
Lindgren 9

did choose to register, government benefits of formalization played a key role in
their decision. Among the most important motivators were freedom from
corruption and the ability to advertise (Cling, 2012). Thus, Cling makes an
important contribution by confirming the effectiveness of structural incentives
such as government benefits and providing a different perspective on the role of
information.
These two works provide a solid, largely quantitative basis for research
on the registration process, but lack an in-depth qualitative analysis of
shopkeepers’ cost-benefit analyses. Additionally, the seeming contradictions in
Woodruff (2013) and Cling (2012) concerning the importance of information
suggest that country-specific factors likely play a large role in determining the
effectiveness of various informal economy registration efforts. My qualitative
research complements these studies by providing an in-depth investigation into
the decision making processes of Nepali shopkeepers who are considering
registration as well as those who have already registered. This study’s
investigation of shopkeepers’ cost-benefit analyses sheds light on the reasons
shopkeepers choose to register or remain unregistered, thereby helping to explain
some of the causes for Nepal’s large informal economy. The addition of
interviews with Nepali informal sector experts and government officials
illuminates how many of the bureaucratic processes discussed actually function.
I find that because information is disseminated so poorly, there often is a large
gap between how shopkeepers perceive bureaucratic processes and how the
government intends them to function.
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As I speak to small unregistered shop owners about formalizing their
enterprises, I find that two primary considerations often discourage them from
registering with the government: the difficulty of the process itself, and their
distrust of the Nepali government. Ultimately, it appears that such political
factors as bureaucratic inefficiency, broken government promises, and
inappropriate legislation are among the primary factors that contribute to Nepal’s
large informal sector. Though the ILO is working to facilitate the registration
process and centralize distribution of benefits, I find that lack of collaboration
and information sharing between various government ministries and NGOs is
hampering the reform process.

2) Methodology
To collect data concerning the informal economy in Nepal, I interviewed
the owners of small shops, government officials, academics, and researchers. My
many discussions with small shop owners accounts for the bulk of my interviews,
as well as the most original and integral component of my research. I defined
small shops for this research as those which are primarily owned and operated by
an individual, family, or partnership, and do not employ laborers who are paid
regular wages.
As I asked owners of small shops in each of my interviews whether their
shop was registered or not (it would be illegal for them not to register) the most
important aspect of my research was ensuring the safety of these shopkeepers.
Almost all of these interviews were conducted in Nepali, as few shopkeepers
spoke fluent English. In some interviews a relative of the shopkeeper who spoke
good English would serve as a translation aid. To initiate an interview I would
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introduce myself to a shopkeeper, explain that I was a student conducting
research about small Nepali shops and the registration process, and show them a
letter written in Nepali script which explained that I was completing an
independent research project. After explaining the goals of my research and my
reasons for doing it, I would ask them if they were willing to talk to me about
their own shop, and its registration status. If they agreed I would go on to
produce an informed consent form, which I would verbally explain in Nepali if
they could not read English. After explaining that they could abstain from
answering any questions, or withdraw from the interview at any time, I
proceeded to give them an English pseudonym for protection, unless they
specifically requested that their real name be used. To mark the interview, I
wrote down only their pseudonym (or name, if requested), the town in which
their shop was located, and the date and time. In cases where the type of shop
was a very common one (cold stores, clothing shops, etc.) I would note the kind
of shop; however, if the shop was unique enough to be identified by mentioning
its wares, I would refrain from writing down this information. At the end of the
interview I asked if the shopkeeper had any questions, and ensured that they felt
comfortable with all of the information they had volunteered being used in my
research. Because interview transcripts contain only a pseudonym and a very
broad locational description, with any potentially identifying information
omitted, I felt that this was appropriate protection for my interviewees.
At the start of my project I intended to interview shop keepers at random
in various areas and neighborhoods, however I quickly found that this was an
inefficient way of conducting my research. My primary problem was that most
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shop owners were not willing to participate in an interview during business hours
when customers could potentially need to be helped. Most shop owners were
also unwilling to interview after the business day was over. Additionally, I found
that even those who did have free time during the business day were sometimes
very wary of my research and did not wish to participate in an interview for fear
they would get in trouble. To solve these problems I ended up conducting many
of my interviews through introductions to various shop owners. Shop owners
tended to be much more willing to speak to me if a friend of theirs introduced
me, explained my research, and vouched for me. Thus, many of my interviews
were conducted through friends, friends of friends, and other distant contacts.
This method of finding interviewees, coupled with the fact that some people
refused to participate in interviews or withdrew from the interview, creates a very
serious selection bias in my research. Because of this, it is important that my
research be understood as a discussion of various perspectives on Nepal’s
informal economy and registration process, as opposed to a representative sample
of shopkeeper’s beliefs. Though a survey would have been helpful in achieving
a more well-rounded consensus on certain issues, it was essentially impossible to
administer given people’s general unwillingness to answer questions concerning
their shop’s legal status without a proper introduction from a friend.
Interviews with government officials, academics and researchers were
ethically simpler because I did not ask whether these people engaged in illegal
activities. All of these interviews were conducted primarily in English.
However, some government and NGO officials required permission from their
superiors to sign a consent form, which was not always granted. They would
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occasionally speak off the record, giving me general information about the
informal economy and future leads, but requesting it not be credited to them or
their organization. After interviews in which this was the case I would prepare a
document with all the information I wished to attribute to the interviewee and
allow them to redact or correct pieces of the information. After this process I was
permitted to use the relevant information in my research.

3) Registration: A Confusing and Unrewarding Process
3.1) Time Constraints, Incentives, and Disincentives
The World Bank’s Doing Business 2010 publication estimates that
registering a business in Nepal requires seven distinct procedures and 31 days of
the business owner’s time, suggesting that Nepal’s cumbersome registration
process may be a main contributor to the size of the informal economy. The
World Bank collects this data by using a case study of what they consider to be a
“typical” company, which is of average size. I find that 15 days emerges as a
consensus for the amount of days it takes to register a very small business,
though 6-7 processes remains a relatively accurate estimate. Many registered
participants in my research specifically remember a 15 day process, while some
participants who had not registered independently produced the number as one
they had heard through friends. Almost all unregistered participants in my
research at some point cited the arduous process as one of their reasons for not
registering. One woman, who asked to be identified only as Kamala, said plainly
that if the process were made easier she would surely register (Kamala, 2014).
Additionally, participants cited vastly different estimates of how much the entire
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process cost them, or how much they expected to pay. One participant expressed
confidence that the fees would amount to approximately 10,000 rupees (Austin,
2014) while another estimated 1,000 (John, 2014). Of those who had been
through the process Kamal recalled 17,000 rupees in fees, while Kumar noted a
6,000 rupee a year cost to remain registered. The complete lack of consensus
regarding registration fees suggests not only a lack of information about the
process, but also the possibility of corruption and bribe-seeking within the
system. The shopkeeper who asked to be identified as Austin mentioned that of
the 10,000 rupees he expected to pay, only four to five thousand accounted for
the actual registration fees, while the remainder would pay for a legal assistant to
assure that he was not cheated during the process.
In addition to the difficulty of the registration process, the ease with
which penalties are avoided and the inaccessibility of government promised
benefits make registering a business a very unappealing process. Austin, who
notes he has many contacts within the government, is the only shopkeeper who
expressed confidence in his ability to obtain government benefits. The
combination of the sway his government friends have and the information they
can give him regarding the process makes him confident that eventually he will
receive the benefits the government promises. He admits, however, that for the
majority of people who do not know government officials, it is extremely
difficult to obtain loans, government-sanctioned electricity and phone
connections to the business location, or any of the other benefits the government
promises. Almost all shopkeepers agreed with Austin’s assessment, expressing
that they had either tried to get benefits from the government and been rebuffed,
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or had been so discouraged by the experiences of their friends and neighbors that
they did not even try. Further interviews showed that in addition to poorly
dispersing incentives, the government is not effectively enforcing disincentives.
The unregistered shopkeepers to whom I spoke were almost universally
not worried about the consequences of operating their businesses illegally.
Though certainly this could be evidence of a self-selection problem in which
those who were worried about the government opted out of talking to me, the
shopkeepers’ experiences with government figures are nonetheless revealing.
Most unregistered shopkeepers said that when government workers came around
they simply told the officials that the shop was very new and they were planning
to register as soon as they had time. Because the registration process is so
difficult it is nearly impossible to force shop owners through the steps of
registration, and most government officials choose not to levy fines or penalties.
Additionally, shopkeepers identified as John and Julie both relied heavily on
imports for their unregistered businesses, even though importing without
registration is illegal. Though both conceded that importing would be a simpler
process with registration, neither feared that they would be punished by the
government, or believed that illegally importing their goods was particularly
difficult. Hector on the other hand, the owner of a legally registered clothing
shop, felt frustrated that his imports were being heavily taxed while unregistered
businesses so easily avoided these taxes.
2.3) Confusion and Under-registration
With the benefits of registration difficult to obtain, shopkeepers often
have little motivation to figure out the complex steps towards properly
Lindgren 16

registering a business. One of the most pressing problems with the registration
process is that the lack of clarity and information availability make the process
difficult to engage in, difficult to study, and difficult to fix. In studying the
informal economy Akash Shrestha, an employee of Samriddhi: The Prosperity
Foundation, found that 37.4% of survey respondents believed Nepal’s
registration process to be easy. Although this seems reasonable, upon following
up with this contingent it was found that the vast majority were improperly
registered and still operating illegally. To properly comply with all government
regulations, a shop owner must register their business with their local governing
body – a municipality office or Village Development Committee (VDC) – the
Ministry of Commerce and Supplies, the central Ministry of Industry, and the
Ministry of Finance (Akash Shrestha, 2014).
In a few cases, I did find shop owners who reported a very simple
registration process taking only a few days, or who expected a simple process
once they got around to registering. A shopkeeper who asked to be identified
only as Kamal reported that registering his business was very simple, took him
only three days, and required him to visit only two different places (Kamal,
2014). John, who plans to register in approximately two months, predicts a
process of 3-4 days (John, 2014). Given the four ministries with which
businesses are required to register, it is almost certain that John and Kamal are
registering their shops incompletely.
This phenomenon of partial or incomplete registration makes it difficult
to properly assess the degree to which the government is intentionally
withholding benefits from small shop owners. In an interview Mr. Shrestha
Lindgren 17

stated that many shopkeepers are not receiving the benefits they were promised
because they are improperly registered (Akash Shrestha, 2014). Thus, without
conducting a thorough examination of a shopkeeper’s registration process and
the way they went about claiming their benefits, it is impossible to understand
whether benefits were legally or illegally denied to them. With such a difficult
process for both registering and claiming benefits, it is easy for government
officials to deny wrongdoing, and very difficult to agitate for proper dispensation
of benefits.
Mr. Krishna Man Shrestha heads the Kirana Pasal Byaapaar Sangh, an
organization representing the interests of small food shops. Mr. Shrestha
believes that a “one window policy” – one in which shopkeepers need only to
register in one ministry and this ministry shares the shopkeeper’s information
with other government offices – is the most important step towards reform. He
says it is imperative for small shops to register with the government, but that the
difficulty of registration discourages people who otherwise would be willing to
register (Krishna Man Shrestha, 2014). This policy would also ensure that no
businesses are partially registered, thereby increasing the ease with which
shopkeepers could claim benefits and government agencies who withheld
benefits could be exposed.
In addition to being confused about the registration process, none of the
shopkeepers I interviewed were aware of the specific incentives offered by the
ILO’s campaign. While many knew of the more longstanding government
benefits such as being able to take out a loan, none knew that the ILO had
partnered with Megabank to make taking out a loan easier, and few knew about
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the business trainings offered by the ILO. Komal Bhatta works for the
Employment Fund, a program of the Swiss NGO Helvetas which works directly
with the ILO, and yet even he knew nothing about the benefits from the new
campaign.
Mr. Bhatta runs a program for the Employment Fund which teaches
marginalized youth vocational and business skills, ultimately culminating in each
individual operating their own micro-enterprise. The program employs phased
incentives, in which participants receive monetary grants after achieving certain
goals, such as completing training, operating a business, and remaining employed
for a certain time period after the training ends. Because the program works with
the Nepali government, graduates of the program are supposed to formally
register their businesses before they receive a payout. Mr. Bhatta, however, says
that the program has changed the requirement for payout from registering a
business to operating a business, because the registration process has been so
frustrating for many micro-enterprise owners. He believes that forcing program
graduates to register does nothing but create animosity towards the government
when people inevitably run into bureaucratic hurdles. Instead, Mr. Bhatta says
that allowing graduates to register when they are ready makes it more likely that
they complete the process and maintain a positive attitude towards the
government.
Shailendra Kumar Jha of the ILO believes that poor information
dissemination and lackluster collaboration among stakeholders are two of the
most important problems to tackle in registering the informal economy. He says
that the ILO is currently conducting an informational campaign to reach
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shopkeepers, and working to centralize registration activities at the District
Cottage and Small Industry Office. Because the registration process is currently
scattered among various government industries, it is difficult for initiatives which
should be working together to coordinate. Missed opportunities due to poor
information are not uncommon. He believes that with registration activities
centralized in one place, government ministries, NGOs, and other stakeholders
will be better able to collaborate (Kumar Jha, 2014).
Professor Ram Chandra Dhakal, head of Tribhuvan University’s Center
for Economic Development and Administration (CEDA), believes that much of
the distrust and confusion surrounding registration is the result of certain
ministries prioritizing tax collection over other aspects of registration (Dhakal,
2014). To properly register a business the owner must first register with the
District Cottage and Small Industry Office, after which they can register with the
municipality office, tax office, and industry-specific office (Kumar Jha, 2014).
However, certain ministries intentionally overlook incorrectly done registrations
so long as their office is receiving taxes or fees. Thus, shopkeepers sometimes
end up incompletely registered and ineligible to collect government benefits even
though they are paying taxes.
2.4) Post-Registration Difficulties
Akash Shrestha warns that registering businesses too hastily could prove
to be a problem for Nepal’s economy. Given the largely inefficient bureaucracy,
Mr. Shrestha worries that small shops, which are currently a strong source of
income and employment for Nepali people, could suffer or even fail due to
burdensome government regulations. Mr. Shrestha, who conducted many
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interviews with shopkeepers for his own research, has sometimes found that
shopkeepers who were doing good business before registration feel harassed by
the government after they register. He tells a story of one man who began selling
packages of rice, and saw his business grow. Though most stores carrying rice
weigh out the rice depending on how much people want, this shop owner found
that one and two kilogram orders were the most popular, so he began prepackaging orders of this size. As people found they could save time by quickly
grabbing a package instead of waiting for their rice to be weighed, his shop
began to grow, and so he registered. After registration, the shop was visited by
government officials who subjected the packages to harsh regulations, saying that
packaged food needed to be inspected for cleanliness and needed to comply with
a host of other requirements, even though the food he sold was in no way
different from the unpackaged rice other stores offered. Rather than attempt to
navigate the bureaucracy surrounding compliance with these regulations, the
shopkeeper went back to weighing rice on demand and stopped selling the
packages that had been driving his shop’s growth (Akash Shrestha, 2014).
Many shopkeepers fear registration because it puts them on the
government’s radar, or simply because they cannot afford the time it takes to
register. Kamala says that she feels unable to register because the difficult
process would force her to close her shop for fifteen days, which she simply
cannot afford to do. Anju, who has registered her shop, now feels trapped by the
government. Every year she must re-register her shop, a process which, though
simpler than the initial registration, she still finds difficult. Before voluntarily
registering she had never been forced to pay a fine, but now that she is officially
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in the government’s books she faces steep penalties if she fails to re-register
every year. She says that the time she must take away from tending to her
business to register every year is harmful. Because many shopkeepers do not
trust the government, or find the bureaucracy to be inefficient, they simply fear
being monitored by the government. Though most say that the taxes they would
pay if registered are practically negligible, they fear that the government could
change tax structure or regulations in the future. Anju, frustrated by how
registration has affected her shop, says that the benefit she wants most from the
government is “laws like those in other countries1” (Anju, 2014).

4) Relationships With the Government
4.1) Negative Views and Mindset Changes
Though the literature surrounding registration focuses on the role of
individual incentives, participants in my research generally disregarded
individual benefits when considering registration, instead focusing on the
government’s overall performance. When asked why they chose to operate their
shops illegally, almost all unregistered shopkeepers I interviewed responded that
the government’s inability to provide good roads, water systems, and electricity
made them feel as though the government did not have a right to tax and regulate
them. David, whose shop has been operating for over twenty years, describes the
government as “the biggest thieves2” and does not plan to register. Though when
asked about benefits to his shop he replies that only big businesses are able to get

1

Quote translated from Nepali

2

Quote translated from Nepali
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benefits, he makes it clear that he is much more concerned about the larger
infrastructural failures of Nepal’s government (David, 2014).
Not all have such drastic views as David, but even those participants who
are not particularly angry at the government see its failures as a rational reason
for avoiding taxes. Jay, who said his business has been bad this year, plans to
register when he sees sales picking up. Until then, he feels that he has a right to
remain unregistered given how poorly the government is responding to the needs
of its citizens. Although Jay eventually wants to operate his business legally, he
feels that because the government uses his taxes so poorly, he has no
responsibility to pay them until he sees positive developments in the government
(Jay, 2014). Kamala states simply that if the government improves, she will
surely go register (Kamala, 2014). Many participants in my research who
registered despite negative views of the government said that they registered
merely because it was compulsory. These participants mostly reported having
not given registration much thought, though some later regret having registered
without having considered the costs and the benefits.
Some believe that justifying tax evasion based on poor government
performance inevitably creates vicious cycles of low tax revenues, under-funded
governments, poor infrastructure, and further tax evasion. Komal Bhatta of the
Employment Fund believes that a mindset change among shopkeepers is
necessary to break this negative feedback loop. Though Mr. Bhatta has
repeatedly seen firsthand the frustrations of registration, he still feels that the
Nepali people should feel a duty to register their businesses and pay their taxes.
He believes that “responsible citizen” thinking is emerging in the Nepali people,
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and when this kind of thinking becomes widespread it will help to break the
vicious cycle of poor infrastructure, lack of faith in government, and tax evasion.
Even so, Mr. Bhatta admits that the government has largely crafted policies
which favor big enterprises over small shops, and that the government has a part
to play in breaking this cycle (Bhatta, 2014).
Krishna Man Shrestha of the Kirana Byaapaari Sangh, however, believes
that a mindset change can also be instrumental in combating policies which are
unfavorable for small businesses. Mr. Shrestha believes that ultimately
registration will greatly improve the growth potential of Nepal’s microenterprises. Currently, Mr. Shrestha believes that a major problem with
informality is the government’s lack of information concerning the economic
activities that occur in the informal sector. Without access to this information
Mr. Shrestha believes the government is incapable of making policy which is
conducive to economic growth and increased employment in small businesses.
A tendency for government policy to favor large enterprises, which shopkeepers
I interviewed largely believed to be a deliberate attempt to ignore them, may
instead be the result of a lack of information. Thus, Mr. Shrestha recommends a
mindset change among shopkeepers in which they recognize the collective
benefits of registration and provide the government the information it needs to
make informed policies (Krishna Man Shrestha, 2014).
While belief in a “mindset change” method of solving Nepal’s microenterprise problems accurately identifies what the Nepali government needs, it
cannot make predictions about what the government will do. It is true that
without an adequate tax base the Nepali government cannot fund infrastructural
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projects, and that without collecting information on micro-enterprises the Nepali
government cannot write informed policy. This does not mean, however, that
with adequate tax revenue and information the government would effectively fix
Nepal’s infrastructural problems and rewrite policy to favor small businesses.
The idea that mindset change is necessary places the entire burden of Nepal’s
problems squarely on the shoulders of poor Nepali citizens, asking them to trust
that the government will fulfill its role after they have fulfilled theirs.
Shopkeepers such as David and Jay, who have not seen government promises
fulfilled in the past, or tax dollars put to good use, prefer to wait for signs of
improvement in the government before they change their mindset and register
their businesses.
The performance of the current government, in fact, suggests that tax
evasion may not be hurting the government as much as some claim. The
Himalayan Times reports that in the 2013 fiscal year the government was only
able to spend about half of its budget (The Himalayan Times, 2013). In 2014
The Himalayan Times credits a poor planning process and ad hoc decision
making as the government again fails to spend even half of its fiscal year budget
(The Himalayan Times, 2014). The government’s inability to spend its budget
despite Nepal’s glaring infrastructure problems suggests that greater tax flows
are unlikely to fix the problems that shopkeepers complain about. Thus, it seems
that tax evasion is not likely to be related to Nepal’s infrastructural failures.
4.2) I Want to Pay Taxes
However much certain shopkeepers may distrust the government, the idea
of mindset change is far from a pipe dream. When asked what the primary
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benefits of registration were, shopkeepers Kumar and Kamal both cited the
ability to pay their taxes as one of the most important aspects of operating their
businesses legally. When I used a more specific question, asking what the
government had directly done for their shops since registration, but Kumar and
Kamal replied that the government does not provide benefits to small shops.
And yet despite the fact that the government has done nothing for them directly,
both shopkeepers feel happy to register their shops and pay their taxes.
The key to Kumar and Kamal’s willingness to operate their businesses
legally seems to lie in how they perceive their current and future governments.
Kamal has faith in the current Nepali government, saying that he feels his taxes
go towards important development projects. Though Kumar does not express
such optimism concerning the current Nepali government, he does believe that in
the future the government will stabilize. He says that he expects the government
to begin fulfilling the promises it has made to small registered shops within a
year of stabilization.

5) Discussion/Analysis
Dr. Ram Chandra Dhakal of Tribhuvan University identifies two keys to
registering Nepal’s informal economy: improving the registration process and
having the government follow through on its promises to shopkeepers (Dhakal,
2014). My research supports these views, showing that to the shopkeepers whom
I interviewed the difficulties of registration and their level of trust in the
government tended to be the primary factors in their decision about whether to
register.
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My findings also strengthen a trend in the informal sector literature which
indicates that political factors may be even more important than market factors in
determining the size of a country’s informal economy. Professor Dhakal agrees,
stating that many used to believe Nepal’s economic growth would eradicate
informal activities, but people have now begun to understand the importance of
political factors. Though certainly Professor Dhakal sees nothing wrong with the
ILO’s campaign or NGO initiatives, he believes that such efforts play a minor
part in addressing the problems of the informal economy compared to rectifying
the larger issues of poor policy and political instability (Dhakal, 2014).
Certainly the most important finding of this study is that the Nepali
government has the most important role to play in encouraging registration of the
informal economy, and yet these findings can also inform the actions of both
government and non-government initiatives. It is important to note that a lack of
information sharing and communication accounts for many of the problems
discussed in this paper. The difficulty of the business registration process stems
largely from the unwillingness of various ministries to share information and
collaborate. Similarly, NGOs miss many important opportunities when they fail
to communicate with the government and one another. By working with the
Employment Fund, the ILO could be disseminating information about the
incentives it offers for registration to many new small business owners, and yet
even Mr. Bhatta who runs the skill and business training program knows nothing
about the ILO’s campaign. My findings suggest that individuals or NGOs
working with the informal sector – or perhaps any sector – in Nepal should strive
to combat the inefficiencies that arise when information sharing and
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collaboration are not practiced. Essentially, the process of registering the
informal economy is one that will be defined by the government’s actions in the
coming years as well as NGOs’ willingness to support the government as
opposed to spearheading isolated initiatives.
Another important implication of this research is that government
agencies and NGOs working to register the informal sector should tread
carefully; a short-term rise in the number of registered businesses does not
necessarily indicate success. Firstly, the initiatives must take into account
whether businesses can survive the registration process and post-registration
difficulties. If businesses are unable to sustain themselves because of time taken
off for registration, or crumble under new regulations and suffocating
bureaucracy, then registration can hardly be called a success. As De Soto argues
in The Other Path and Akash Shrestha notes in the Nepali context, governments
should create a business environment and bureaucracy conducive to growth,
employment, and prosperity before they focus their efforts on eradicating
informal enterprises (De Soto, 1989)(Shrestha, 2014). The government should
especially take into account that because they have not been collecting
information about informal economic activities, their current policy may not be
appropriate for regulating the kinds of businesses that are currently unregistered.
As such, if the government expects such business to enter the formal economy,
they must be alert for signs of inappropriate policies and be willing to adjust and
rewrite accordingly.
Secondly, all initiatives must consider that, in the long run, trust in the
government appears to be of utmost importance for convincing businesses to
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operate legally. This means that any gains in registration caused by offering
incentives is likely to be offset by future decreases in registration if the
government does not follow through on its promises. Given the registration costbenefit analysis described by participants in my research, it seems that building
strong relationships between shopkeepers and the government should be
prioritized over any short-term strategy to increase registration. The government,
and any other agencies involved in registration, should ensure that they are able
to follow through with any promises they make.
While it is important for ministries and NGOs involved in registration to
practice information sharing, collaboration, and flexible policy, we must keep in
mind that political instability on a greater scale also contributes to Nepal’s large
informal economy. Lack of proper infrastructure and distrust of the government
as a whole are problems which have profound implications for Nepal’s informal
economy. Despite any future improvements to registration made by the ILO,
various ministries, or NGOs, it seems that many shopkeepers will continue to
operate illegally until Nepal’s government stabilizes.
Though the opinions of those who participated in my research can
certainly help inform future decisions surrounding registration, my findings must
be understood as what they are: a non-random collection of shopkeeper opinions
rather than a representative sample, or a quantitative analysis of people’s beliefs.
The shopkeepers I interviewed almost all had some social connection to me, were
all willing to talk about their registration status, and were mostly concentrated
within a similar geographic area. In short, there is undoubtedly selection bias in
the series of opinions expressed in these pages. Additionally, there is no way of
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ensuring that opinions expressed to me were truly felt by the interviewees, as
opposed to being expressed in order to sound patriotic, or for fear of being found
by the government. Indeed, there is no way even to completely ensure that those
who claimed to be registered indeed were.
Despite these limitations, this research gives shopkeepers a platform to
express what matters to them. Future research should work to address these
limitations, and either strengthen or challenge my conclusions so that good
policy recommendations can be made. If researchers can overcome the barrier of
fear that exists when discussing illegal activities, a quantitatively rigorous survey
analysis of shopkeepers’ registration statuses and opinions would provide more
substantial evidence on which to inform the government’s actions. Additionally,
expanding the interviewee base to sectors beyond small retail shops would help
to give a more balanced perspective on Nepal’s informal sector. According to
the ILO, tourist services, agricultural activities, and construction companies are
among the other sectors in Nepal which are disproportionally informal. Before
writing policy that would affect all informal enterprises, more research must be
done on how other sections of Nepal’s informal economy feel about the
registration process. Lastly, future research should investigate the effects of
bureaucratic inefficiencies, distrust of government, and lack of information
sharing on other initiatives in Nepal. Clearly these three problems have posed
numerous difficulties to Nepal’s informal sector and the government’s attempts
to register it, and there is no reason to believe these same problems do not have
wide-ranging effects across Nepal.

Lindgren 30

6) Conclusion
My research contributes to the largely macro-level discussion of informal
economies by providing qualitative information directly from shopkeepers
participating in the informal economy, NGOs studying and serving the informal
economy, and government figures running initiatives which affect the informal
economy. Additionally, this study adds to the Nepali-specific informal economy
literature which, given the many state-specific aspects of the informal economy,
is critical for forming policy recommendations. Based on the opinions of those I
interviewed it seems that the persistence of Nepal’s informal sector is largely
driven by a difficult and confusing registration process, poor information sharing
and collaboration among various government ministries, as well as NGOs, and a
general distrust of the government.
It seems that to productively integrate the informal economy into the
formal, the government must focus on building trust among Nepali citizens,
encouraging collaboration among ministries to centralize the registration process,
and writing flexible policy concerning the informal economy. NGOs involved
with the informal economy should recognize that the government has the largest
role to play in registering the informal economy, and thus should actively pursue
collaboration with the government. Though some believe that a mindset change
among Nepali citizens is the first step towards breaking the vicious cycles
described in this research, I find that shopkeepers often have good reason for
being skeptical of the government. It seems more likely that the government can
break these cycles by building trust among shopkeepers than that Nepali citizens
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will spontaneously develop “responsible citizen thinking” without impetus from
the government.
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